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ARGUING ABOUT RIGHTS
Charles M. Yablon *
RAWLS AND RIGHTS. By Rex Martin. Lawrence, Kansas: University
Press of Kansas. 1985. Pp. xii, 244. $29.95.

Fifteen years after the publication of his only book, A Theory of
Justice, 1 John Rawls' work remains central to the debate about the
nature of justice in a liberal society.2 Rawls' theory continues to engage the attention not only of philosophers, but of political and social
theorists and lawyers, and has even been cited in some recent judicial
opinions. 3 The publication of Professor Rex Martin's new book,
Rawls and Rights, provides a good opportunity to consider the nature
of Rawls' influence and the continuing appeal of a "Rawlsian" approach to questions of social justice. Martin's work is, I believe, the
first book about Rawls that is neither a critique nor an exposition of A
Theory of Justice. Rather, it is an independent work that seeks to expand and make explicit the implications of Rawls' work in areas
Rawls himselfleaves vague, particularly the concept of "rights." Martin also attempts, when possible, to improve on Rawls' arguments and
meet the objections of his critics. Thus, Martin's book represents an
important step in the development of a "Rawlsian school" of
philosophy.
The fact that Rawls' work continues to play such a central role in
current debates about political and moral philosophy is itself an inter• Associate Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. A.B.
1972, Columbia University; J.D. 1975, Yale Law School. I am grateful to David Carlson, Arthur
Jacobson, Michel Rosenfeld, David Rudenstine and Paul Shupack for their helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this piece.
1. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
2. The basic outline of Rawls' project is well known. He attempts to describe justice as the
principles that would be chosen in a hypothetical "original position" in which individuals,
although rational and knowledgeable generally about human nature and human society, have no
knowledge of their own place in society or even their own talents and abilities. Such individuals,
Rawls says, would choose an equal distribution of all the "social primary goods" - liberty and
opportunity, income and wealth - unless an unequal distribution of one of these goods is to the
advantage of the least favored member of society. Id. at 303.
3. A recent computer search revealed 181 citations to A Theory of Justice in recently published law review articles and notes. References to Rawls can be found not only in pieces dealing
with jurisprudence or constitutional law, but in discussions of promissory estoppel, Farber &
Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake," 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 903, 936 (1985); bankruptcy, Carlson, Philosophy in Bankruptcy (Book Review), 85
MICH. L. REV. 1341 (1987); and education law, Yudof, Effective Schools and Federal and State
Constitutions: A Variety of Opinions, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 865, 878 (1985). The computer search
also showed that, although the Supreme Court has never cited Rawls, his book has been referred
to five times in opinions of United States Courts of Appeals.
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esting phenomenon. His book has been subjected to careful examination and criticism by numerous philosophers and political theorists,
who have claimed to reveal serious flaws in his premises and in the
consistency of his arguments. For example, Nozick argues that
Rawls' treatment of individual talents and abilities as the common assets of society is inconsistent with Rawls' commitment to treating individuals as ends and not means. 4 Arrow and Harsanyi have questioned
whether the "maximin" principle, that inequalities are to be arranged
to maximize the welfare of the least advantaged member of society, is
the rational choice for individuals in the original position. 5 Wolff
points out that Rawls' argument shares with utilitarianism the questionable premise that human lives involve plans by which individuals
seek to maximize various theoretically unknowable and morally
equivalent "goods." 6 Sandel questions Rawls' premise that justice is
the "first virtue of social institutions," arguing that such a claim relies
on a peculiar and unappealing concept of the individual.7 These critiques demonstrate that Rawls' continued popularity is not based on the
incontestability of either his premises or conclusions, or on their acceptance by other political theorists.
Yet it would be equally wrong to view Rawls' work as popular
simply because it potentially provides a comfortable justification of the
contemporary American liberal state. It is not at all clear that Rawls'
vision of the just society, with its powerful egalitarian presumptions,
bears much resemblance to contemporary American society, even in
its more idealized forms. 8 Martin's book, which argues that Rawlsian
principles require that the lowest economic class in a society (he suggests the lowest quartile) has a "basic right" to income supplementation (pp. 120-22), certainly does not make Rawls seem like an
apologist for the status quo. Moreover, utilitarianism and intuitionism
can be equally comforting defenders of the prevailing system. 9
Rather, three factors seem primarily responsible for the continuing
popularity of Rawls' work. The first, of course, is the excellence of A
Theory of Justice itself, which contains much fine philosophical argu4. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 228 (1974).
5. Arrow, Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Raw/s's Theory of Justice (Book Review), 70
J. PHIL. 245 (1973); Harsanyi, Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A
Critique of John Raw/s's Theory, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 594 (1975).
6. R. WOLFF, UNDERSTANDING RAWLS 208 (1977).
7. M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 30-34 (1982); see note 42 infra.
8. David A.J. Richards has noted the compatability of much ofRawlsian theory with Marxist argument. See Richards, Buchanan, Marx and Justice; Lukes, Marxism and Morality; Nielsen, Equality and Liberty (Book Review), 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1188 (1985).
9. A different version of this argument would claim that what Rawls has provided is not a
justification of the status quo, but of the American liberal political ideology. This is probably
closer to the truth, but it is also closer to Rawls' declared goal of clarifying and justifying a vision
of the just society that is shared by many Americans. See notes 35-38 infra and accompanying
text.
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ment and also represents, at least for this generation, a. contractarian
tradition in political theory that goes back at least as far as Hobbes. 10
The second is the extraordinary ability of Rawls' work to stimulate
and provoke creative responses from those who differ with him. For
example, both Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia 11 and Michael
Walzer's Spheres of Justice 12 were apparently in part the outgrowth of
a course the two jointly taught in Rawls' philosophy.
The third factor, which has received comparatively little attention
in the critical literature, is the method and style of argument Rawls
adopts in A Theory of Justice. Rawls rejects a logical deductive argument method in favor of the "reflective equilibrium" method, a style of
argument which favors persuasion and agreement rather than logic
and proof. Some of the most impressive aspects of that book are
Rawls' explicit discussion of the methodological difficulties of putting
forward and defending a philosophical concept of justice, and his recognition of the limitations of any such philosophical system. Rawls
purports only to be presenting "a" theory of justice, and he expressly
recognizes that his work can only succeed to the extent he formulates
principles which provide a good "match" with the existing moral
judgments of his readers. 13 Thus, Rawls recognizes that moral philosophy, at least as he intends to pursue it, is a matter of persuasion
rather than rigid deductions from first principles. 14
This is a method of thinking and arguing about ethical issues that
is more familiar to lawyers than philosophers. In the first section of
this piece, I want to consider in some detail Rawls' methodology in A
Theory of Justice, to show how Rawls' argument relies neither on
purely deductive logic nor empirical claims but on a form of argumentation similar to that oflawyers. This analysis leads to an appreciation
of Rawls' philosophy for providing not so much a specific vision of the
just society as an account of arguments about justice, an elucidation of
the kinds of claims that must be made about an institution to persuade
others that it is just.
The second section of the piece deals more specifically with Martin's book, Rawls and Rights. It considers Martin's attempts to defend
Rawls against the criticisms of the last fifteen years and to clarify and
10. See generally Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Relation Between Classical Contract
Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. REV. 769, 790-98 (1985).
11. R. NOZICK, supra note 4.
12. M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983).
13. J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 50.
14. In his latest writings, Rawls has increasingly stressed the importance that persuasion and
consensus play in his theory. See Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL.
& Pue. AFF. 223 (1985); Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1987). While these works support the view of Rawls' methodology being put forward
in the first part of this essay, I have chosen to try to support my argument with quotations from
A Theory ofJustice itself to show that the method I am describing was an integral part of Rawls'
philosophical method as set forth in that book, rather than a subsequent change in his theory.
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concretize the implications of a Rawlsian system, particularly with respect to individual rights. The former project, I think, succeeds fairly
well. The latter is frustrated by an overly determinate and oversimplified concept of law and the nature of legal argument.
I

John Rawls thinks like a lawyer. I want to defend this highly controversial claim by considering three of the distinctive features of
Rawls' philosophy: (1) the concept of "reflective equilibrium," (2) the
nature of the argument in the original position, and (3) Rawls' recognition of the indeterminacy of the principles of justice and the need for
additional arguments about justice as one reaches more specific stages
of social organization.

A. Reflective Equilibrium
Traditionally, the task of moral philosophy has been conceived as
the attempt to establish the truth of certain moral positions. In attempting to do this, moral philosophers have generally relied on deductive forms of argument. They have sought to prove the correctness
of a moral position by demonstrating that it necessarily follows from
more fundamental ethical premises. 15 If the task of moral philosophy
is perceived in this way, any inconsistency between premises and conclusions is fatal.
Another approach to moral philosophy conceives its task as the
discovery, clarification, and elucidation of existing moral beliefs. 16
These philosophers rely on a more inductive form of argument, seeking to derive insights into the "good" and the "right" from moral
judgments people actually make. For these philosophers, a demonstration that people do not use moral terms or make moral judgments
in the way their theory claims is fatal to the argument.
Rawls' notion of reflective equilibrium is an attempt to describe the
goal of moral philosophy, and formulate a method of moral argument,
that steers a middle path between these two conceptions and avoids
the pitfalls of both. For Rawls, moral philosophy is neither a deduc15. Justifying such fundamental premises was, of course, the most difficult part of these arguments. Kant, for example, puts the categorical imperative forward as a nonempirical principle,
required by the faculty of reason. I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE: PART
I OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (J. Ladd trans. 1965). Mill does not claim the same selfevidence for his utilitarian principle, but bases it on what he believes are universal psychological
traits. Mill is equally concerned to show that correct moral actions may be derived deductively
from his principle. J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1863).
16. This was the project of the ordinary language school of philosophy, which sought to
understand how people used words like "good" and "right." R. HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF
MORALS (1952); Stevenson, The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms, 52 MIND 14 (1940). It is
also, in a somewhat different sense, the project of intuitionist schools of moral philosophy, which
base their moral theories on claims about the moral beliefs people actually have, rather than
those they should have. Strawson, Ethical Intuitionism, 24 PHIL. 23 (1949).
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tive nor an empirical study, but a dialectical progression between the
two methods. It involves a continuous process of checking the implications of proposed moral principles against our preexisting considered moral judgments, modifying each in light of the other until a state
of "reflective equilibrium" is reached, a state in which a set of moral
principles "matches" our considered moral judgments. 17
Every moral theory, of course, depends to some extent on its "fit"
with our preexisting moral judgments. Consider the following two
premises as alternative bases for a system of justice:
(1) A just society is one which maximizes the greatest possible
benefit for the greatest number.
(2) A just society is one which maximizes the greatest amount of
chocolate ice cream for the greatest number.
I am quite certain that neither of these premises can be shown to
be true on the basis of some more fundamental moral principle; they
must be taken as axioms of the system. I am also quite certain that I
can apply premise number two in a far more consistent and determinate fashion than I can premise number one. (After all, it is much
easier to tell if something is chocolate ice cream than if it is a "benefit.") Nonetheless, premise one is at least a plausible basis for a conception of justice, because it seems to capture some aspects of our
preexisting moral judgments, while premise two does not.
In Rawls' concept of reflective equilibrium, however, considered
moral judgments act as more than just a check on the plausibility of an
independently deduced moral system. They play an active part in developing moral principles. Rawls believes that moral principles may
be induced from our considered moral judgments as well as deduced
from fundamental premises. He is willing to use both methods together to develop his moral system. Rawls analogizes this interplay
between principles derived from moral judgments and judgments derived from principles to the interplay of inductive and deductive
method in scientific thought. 18
Rawls does not create any clear priority between deductive principles and considered moral judgments. He does not argue, like the intuitionists, that any moral claim that does not comport with our
existing moral beliefs must be discarded, nor does he believe, like certain utilitarians, that we must abandon intuitive moral judgments that
conflict with an overarching moral principle. Rather, Rawls recognizes a certain malleability both in our considered moral judgments
and in our formulation of principles. He is aware that a powerful argument from principle can sometimes alter our existing moral judgments, and that a powerful intuitive judgment can cause us to modify
17. J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 46-53.
18. Id. at 20 n.7.
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or create an exception to a moral principle. Moral argument for
Rawls involves a continuing juxtaposition of proposed principles
against considered judgments with each having the power to alter the
other. 19
This notion of reflective equilibrium does lead to a certain ad hoc
quality in some of Rawls' argument, and has contributed to a lack of
clarity some have criticized in A Theory of Justice. 20 Since there is no
clear priority between proposed principles and considered moral judgments, the system does not flow deductively from a few simple premises, but must be separately worked out at each step of social
organization. More important, the absence of a priority between
moral principles and considered judgments means that one cannot abstractly predict which will prevail in a given situation. The only way
the dialectic of reflective equilibrium can progress is by evaluating the
actual strength, the persuasive power of the particular arguments
made, and seeing which one succeeds.
This is perhaps the most intriguing aspect of Rawls' method: his
emphasis on the importance of persuasive argument rather than logical demonstration or refutation. Rawls does not expect to be able to
prove his system in the rigorous manner of a logician or even an empirical scientist. Rather, his method requires him to persuade the
reader by making a convincing argument, appealing at times to considered moral judgments, at others to proposed principles, and relying
at all times on the belief that the reader's evaluations of the relative
strengths of these arguments agree with his own. 21 As he says, "[s]o
for the purposes of this book, the views of the reader and the author
are the only ones that count. The opinions of others are used only to
clear our own heads. "22
By now, most lawyers will have noticed the similarities between
Rawls' method and the familiar characteristics of legal argument, particularly common law arguments involving precedent. The interplay
Rawls envisions between inductive and deductive methods is quite familiar to lawyers, who easily move back and forth between arguments
in which they seek to derive and justify rules of decision based on prior
cases, and arguments which seek to overturn or modify precedent by
applying a more consistent or clearer legal rule. Like Rawls' concep19. "By going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the contractual circumstances, at others withdrawing our judgments and conforming them to principle, I assume that
eventually we shall find a description of the initial situation that both expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted."
Id. at 20.
20. See, e.g., R. WOLFF, supra note 6, at 3 ("The logical status of the claims in the book never
becomes entirely clear, despite Rawls's manifest concern with matters of that sort.").
21. At one point, Rawls describes the requirements of the original position as setting "reasonable constraints on arguments for accepting principles." J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 446.
22. Id. at 50.
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tion of moral philosophy, law involves a continuing process of altering
rules in light of cases and cases in light of rules, seeking a consistency
that is never finally achieved; and like Rawls, lawyers are much more
concerned with persuasion than logical demonstration. 23
B.

The Original Position

Another controversial feature of Rawls' work is the epistemological status of the argument from the original position. One of Rawls'
central claims, of course, is that his principles of justice are the principles that would be chosen by individuals in the original position.
Rawls describes the original position by telling us what attributes the
individuals in that position share with us (e.g., rationality, ability to
formulate desires and life plans) and which attributes they lack (e.g.,
envy, knowledge of their individual talents and abilities). The question is what kind of claim Rawls is making when he states that such
hypothetical individuals would choose a particular conception of
justice.
In answering this question, Rawls faces a dilemma that parallels
his problem in choosing between a deductive and an empirical method
of moral philosophy. He might seek to show that, given the attributes
of individuals in the original position, his principles are the only ones
that could be rationally chosen. Indeed, some critics have perceived
Rawls' argument that way, and have attempted to refute it by showing
that principles other than Rawls' could be rational choices given the
constraints of the original position. 24
But if all Rawls is claiming is that his principles must necessarily
be chosen given the attributes of individuals in the original position, he
is not saying very much about justice. I too can justify my principle of
the maximization of chocolate ice cream, by postulating an original
position in which individuals have no knowledge or desires other than
that chocolate ice cream exists and is delicious. My principle is the
one that would necessarily be chosen in my original position, but it is
not very persuasive as a conception of justice.
23. This emphasis on persuasion also enables Rawls to withstand attacks that would be fatal
to either a purely deductive or purely empirical system. To the extent that Rawls' theory is
justified by our considered moral judgments, he is not as concerned as a purely deductive theorist
would be in defending the incontrovertibility of his premises. He can even tolerate a certain level
of inconsistency, since the method of reflective equilibrium may require the adoption of certain
exceptions to general rules or ad hoc rules for special cases. Similarly, it is not crucial to Rawls
that his principles comport in all respects with our considered moral judgments, since there are
grounds, under reflective equilibrium, to claim that the principles should alter our considered
judgments.
24. See, e.g., Harsanyi, supra note 5, at 596-97; Rae, Maximin Justice and an Alternative
Principle of General Advantage, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 630 (1975); Wolff, supra note 6, at 14279. Wolff believes, based primarily on a reading of Rawls' earlier works, that Rawls originally
conceived of his principles as being proven deductively as the solution to the game-theoretic
situation created in the original position. Id. at 16-34.
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One of the strongest parts of Martin's book is his emphasis and
elucidation of the "nondeductive" nature of Rawls' argument. As
Martin states:
One does not literally deduce the principle(s) of justice from a description of the original position. For such a program would be at crosspurposes with Rawls's contention that the desired outcome of the deliberation is a ranking of eligible conceptions of justice. A logical deduction of the two principles from a description of the original position
would not count as ranking them ahead of competing conceptions, such
as average utility; rather, it would count as rendering those other conceptions wholly ineligible. Indeed, if the Rawlsian two principles were
to emerge deductively from a description of the original position, then
Rawls would legitimately be open to the charge that he had built the two
principles into that description in the first place. [p. 16]
But if the statement that the two principles would be chosen in the

original position cannot be true as a matter of deductive logic, neither
can it be true in a contingent or empirical sense. After all, the original
position does not exist. No individuals ever had the attributes Rawls
ascribes to the individuals in the original position. How can Rawls
possibly make contingent or empirical statements about people who
don't exist, or know what such hypothetical people would actually
choose? In what sense, then, can Rawls possibly justify his claim that
these are the principles that would be chosen?
The answer, I believe, is that Rawls seeks to justify his claim by
convincing the reader that his principles are the principles the reader
would choose, if the reader approached the problem with the same
attributes as a person in the original position. 25 Notice the kind of
attributes we are talking about. The reader cannot choose out of motives of personal gain or revenge, since the person in the original position has no knowledge that would enable him or her to formulate such
motives. Rather, the person in the original position makes decisions
based on a regard for the good of all members of society, a general
knowledge of human nature and human social relations, and basic rationality. It is Rawls' claim that such a person would find the argu25. It is natural to ask why, if this agreement is never actually entered into, we should take
any interest in these principles, moral or otherwise. The answer is that the conditions embodied in the description of the original position are ones that we do in fact accept. Or if we
do not, then perhaps we can be persuaded to do so by philosophical reflection.
J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 21.
Rawls, of course, is not the first philosopher to recognize that the persuasiveness of moral
argument must ultimately rest on an assumption of shared conceptions between the author and
the reader. I am grateful to Professor Jacobson for pointing out such an assumption in the
Introduction to Hobbes' Leviathan:
He that is to govern a whole nation, must read in himself, not this or that particular man;
but mankind: which though it be hard to do, harder than to learn any language or science;
yet when I shall have set down my own reading orderly, and perspicuously, the pains left
another, will be only to consider, if he also find not the same in himself. For this kind of
doctrine admitteth no other demonstration.
T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 6 (M. Oakeshott ed. 1944).
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ments in favor of Rawls' principles more persuasive than those of
competing conceptions of justice.
Once again we find that the key to Rawls' claim is not that he has
proven his conception of justice, but that he has elaborated the most
persuasive argument in favor of it. Indeed, the attributes we have just
defined as characterizing decisionmakers in the original position rationality, lack of personal motives, general knowledge of human nature and society, and regard for the good of all members of society are very close to the attributes we would hope to find in an ideal judge.
The original position may be conceived then as an attempt to invoke in
the reader those same attributes of idealized judging and then to persuade the reader,.by convincing argument, that Rawls' conception of
the fundamental principles of justice is to be preferred over competing
conceptions.
C.

The Indeterminacy of Justice

Even though he has attempted to describe the fundamental principles of justice, Rawls is under no illusion that he has thereby defined a
just society. Rawls is well aware that his principles are sufficiently
abstract and general that they may be used to justify a multitude of
differing institutional arrangements, some of which may be substantially preferable to others. Accordingly, Rawls envisions the development of just social institutions as involving at least four stages, each
involving agreement among participants with progressively greater
knowledge of the specific facts about their particular society, and each
stage relying on the more fundamental principles that have been developed in the preceding stages. These stages are: (1) agreement on fundamental principles of justice (the original position), (2) agreement on
basic political institutions and liberties (the constitutional convention),
(3) agreement on specific social rules and policies (legislation), and
(4) agreement on the application of the preceding rules to individuals
(adjudication). 26
What Rawls envisions is a series of debates, at different levels of
social specificity, over the justice of societal institutions. As the debate
becomes more specific, the range of justifiable social choices becomes
more limited for at least two reasons. First, as more contingent facts
about the society are known, the ability to characterize certain institutions as just pursuant to the two principles may change. For example,
in a feudal society in which land is the primary productive asset, a
system of taxation based on real property holdings may be just under
Rawlsian principles. If the society is one with an industrial capitalist
economy, however, a system which taxed real property but not other
26. J. RAWLS, supra note I, at 195-201.
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forms of productive wealth would be quite unjust.21
In the second place, the institutional arrangements agreed to at the
more general stages supply additional rules for making normative
choices at the more specific stages. For example, it may be perfectly
just, at the constitutional level, to agree on a criminal justice system in
which all trials are conducted before judges. But if a constitution has
already been agreed upon, and it provides for a right of trial by jury,
one can nonetheless say, at the legislative and adjudicative levels, that
deprivations of that right are unjust.
Even when the most specific level of social decisionmaking has
been reached, however, Rawls does not expect his system to yield determinate answers to every question of social justice. Rawls recognizes that at every stage in his theory there may be equally persuasive
arguments that justify differing social institutions. As he states:
Of course, this test is often indeterminate: it is not always clear which of
several constitutions, or economic and social arrangements, would be
chosen. But when this is so, justice is to that extent likewise indeterminate. . . . This indeterminacy in the theory of justice is not in itself a
defect. It is what we should expect. Justice as fairness will prove a
worthwhile theory if it defines the range of justice more in accordance
with our considered judgments than do existing theories, and if it singles
out with greater sharpness the graver wrongs a society should avoid. 28

In the same way that Rawls does not believe the principles of justice can be deduced from the original position, he does not believe that
the structure of a just society can be deduced from his principles of
justice. Rather, the principles of justice, and all the subsidiary principles arrived at in the subsequent stages of social organization, serve to
describe and limit the kinds of arguments that can be persuasively
made to establish that a particular social arrangement is just. By arguing for the preferability of his principles over competing concepts like
utilitarianism, and by establishing a careful "lexical order" among his
own principles, Rawls' system enables us to reject certain types of arguments as unjust. 29
What Rawls has provided inA Theory ofJustice is neither a deductive demonstration of the principles of justice, nor a determinate vision
of the just society. Rather, it is an account of how to argue about
questions of justice. He provides us with a means of clarifying and
extending our considered moral judgments and of evaluating and
ranking arguments about justice. 30 The power of Rawls' work rests
27. Id. at 200. Again, there is an interesting parallel to legal argument, which often proceeds
by trying to reduce normative questions to factual ones.
28. Id. at 201.
29. See, e.g., id. at 380 (describing those arguments that may be used to justify conscription).
30. For example, under Rawls' system one could not justify a city's refusal to permit a dem·
onstration by neo-Nazis on the grounds that the costs of police protection would be prohibitive.
While such an argument might be accepted by a classical utilitarian, who would be willing to
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neither on its logical rigor nor on empirical verification, but, as Rawls
himself recognizes, on its ability to convince and persuade.
This provides one key to understanding how Rawls' work has
maintained its vitality in spite of the powerful attacks of his critics,
and its continuing appeal to lawyers as well as philosophers and social
theorists. Because Rawls is not putting forward a deductive theory, he
can withstand a certain amount of inconsistency and a recognition of
exceptions and special cases in the application of his principles. Because he is not seeking empirically to verify his theory, he can tolerate
the observation that his system is based on a conception of human
nature that is controversial and unprovable. Because he recognizes
the inability of arguments about justice always to yield a determinate
result, he need not worry overmuch about attacks on the vagueness of
his theory in application. Finally, because Rawls' work is based on a
process and a way of thinking about justice, rather than on a single
premise or key insight, it can accommodate theorists who may take
quite different views of the justice of various institutions, based on
their differing perceptions of the facts, and on their perceptions of the
relative power of principles and considered moral judgments at the
various stages in Rawls' process. Like a good legal brief, Rawls' theory does not require you to accept every argument it contains. Rather,
it seeks to provide a general framework for thinking and arguing about
these issues, and within that framework to provide at least some argument that persuades.
We return then, to the lawyerly quality of John Rawls' method.
He is able to bring to the consideration of fundamental moral questions much of the lawyer's sense of the interplay between inductive
and deductive modes of argument, the malleability and fact-centeredness of much normative argument. 31 But he is also able to bring, to
weigh the benefit to the neo-Nazis against the savings to the city, Rawls' lexical ordering concept
and the absolute priority of liberty require the rejection of any argument that seeks to deprive
someone of liberty on economic grounds. Nonetheless, while that particular argument fails, the
prohibition could be justified, under Rawls' model, by an argument that the deprivation of the
neo-Nazis' right to demonstrate is required to prevent a greater loss of liberty to others, say, by
preventing a likely outbreak of physical violence.
Notice that Rawls' method again has the interesting effect of turning many questions of justice into factual disputes. Both arguments for and against the neo-Nazi demonstration can be
put forth consistently with Rawlsian principles. The question then seems to resolve into the
factual one of whether sufficient police presence at the demonstration is likely to prevent serious
violence.
By seeking to clarify the kind of attributes a social arrangement would have in order to argue
it was just, Rawls is able to reduce many normative questions to factual ones. For example,
Martin believes that the relative justice of public and private ownership of productive economic
property is, for Rawls, a factual question to be determined by an evaluation of the relative efficiency of the two systems. Pp. 171-73.
31. Philosophy, after all - at least in its current Anglo-American mode - has a rather
impoverished concept of truth. Statements, if true, are either true necessarily or contingently,
and that is pretty much that. Lawyers, who view truth through the perspective of argument,
have a far richer vocabulary. To them, statements may be true as a matter of law, true as a
matter of fact, presumptively true (rebuttably or irrebuttably), true for the sake of argument,
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those who debate and argue questions of social justice at the legislative
or adjudicative level, a framework that helps them to formulate and
evaluate such arguments and to understand the more fundamental
conceptions of justice from which such arguments may derive their
power to persuade.
II

In Rawls and Rights, Rex Martin seeks both to defend the Rawlsian theory of justice from many of the criticisms that have been leveled against it in recent years and to extend and clarify the Rawlsian
analysis in specific areas where Rawls' own treatment has been vague
or cursory - particularly on the issue of rights. Martin brings to this
task great familiarity with Rawls' work, including his writings subsequent to A Theory of Justice. Rawls and Rights is not an exhaustive
restatement of Rawls' theory. It might rather be considered a sort of
"selected topics in Rawlsian philosophy," and it assumes a reasonable
familiarity with Rawls' work and the secondary literature. Much of
the book is based on Martin's previously published articles, which he
has rewritten and integrated with new material. While this gives the
book a somewhat episodic feeling, Rawls' philosophy lends itself to
such an approach, since it too considers various topics at different
levels of abstraction. 32
Martin claims to be expounding Rawls' philosophy, rather than his
own (pp. 207-08), but he is referring to that curious form of philosophical interpretation in which the interpreter is more concerned with formulating the best or most defensible version of someone else's
argument than with attempting a faithful summary or explication of
the arguments actually made. Accordingly, Martin has no compunctions about telling us to dispense with statements Rawls makes
describing rights as social primary goods, because such statements are
"deeply confused and misleading" (p. 30); he jettisons the "maximin
version" of Rawls' difference principle because of "doubts about [its]
efficacy" (pp. 103-05); and he, unlike Rawls, is willing to classify certain economic rights, namely the right to income supplementation, as
a primary right subject to lexical priority, rather than a distributive
matter subject to the difference principle. Martin therefore quite appropriately refers to the theory propounded in his book as "Rawlsian"
philosophy, rather than the philosophy of John Rawls.
Where Martin's book succeeds, and it succeeds to a considerable
concededly true, true because the other side is estopped from denying them, or false but treated
as if they were true (legal fictions). While Rawls' theory of justice does not incorporate quite that
many conceptions of truth (nor would he want it to), his emphasis on the role of argument and
persuasion enables him to bridge the gap between philosophical and legal approaches to ques·
tions of justice.
32. A Theory ofJustice itself is, to a considerable degree, a reworking by Rawls of his previously published articles.
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degree, is in clarifying the nondeductive nature of Rawls' theory and
the central role that argument plays in that theory. Using this insight,
Martin is able to meet many of the criticisms that have been leveled
against Rawls, often by making major revisions in the specific arguments set forth in A Theory of Justice.
Where Martin is less successful, however, is in setting forth a
"Rawlsian" theory of rights. That failure is largely due to his adoption of an overly positivistic view of law. Martin believes that legal
decisions are reached and legal rights maintained by deductive arguments applying authoritative legal principles to specific situations.
This is unfortunate because - while such a view can be found in
Rawls (and indeed seems to predominate when he writes specifically
about law) - Rawls' work is also compatible with a more sophisticated view of law which recognizes the power of specific cases to alter
preexisting legal rules, the potential applicability of many authoritative rules to any specific situation, and both the centrality and indeterminacy of legal argument.
Many of the strengths of Martin's approach can be seen in his discussion of the justification of the "difference principle," the Rawlsian
principle of distribution which requires that social and economic inequalities be arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the
least advantaged members of society (p. 89). In A Theory of Justice
Rawls attempts to justify this principle through the "maximin" argument. He argues that people in the original position, not knowing
what position in society they will occupy or how they will fare in the
distribution of wealth, talents, or abilities, will opt for the distribution
that maximizes the benefit to the least well off.
This is an argument that has come in for considerable criticism
over the years. It assumes a degree of risk aversion on the part of
individuals in the original position that does not appear to comport
with people's general decisionmaking processes under uncertainty and
which does not seem appropriate under various game-theoretic models. Harsanyi points out, for example, that under the maximin principle, if a small amount of some drug were available, which could either
be used marginally to prolong the life of a poor and seriously ill patient, or indefinitely to extend the life of an otherwise healthy individual, the drug should go to the terminally ill patient. 33 Wolff has
demonstrated that maximin is only a rational decision strategy when
the payoff matrix of possible outcomes is configured in a certain way. 34
33. Harsanyi, supra note 5, at 596. Rawls, in response to such counterexamples, has emphasized the multistage nature of his theory, arguing that the principle is not meant to apply to
social decisions at that level of specificity. Rawls, Some Reasons for the Maximin Criterion, 64
AM. EcoN. REv. PAPERS & PROC. 141 (1974). This has also been attacked as a weakness of the
principle. See NOZICK, supra note 4, at 204-08.
34. R. WOLFF, supra note 6, at 168-70. Wolff points out that Rawls' argument assumes that
individuals will have an almost right-angled utility function of the sort reproduced below:
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Martin ·handles these criticisms in the most effective possible way:
he suggests we discard the maximin argument completely (pp. 10304). He argues that Rawls' difference principle does not need the maximin argument to justify it; rather, it can be justified in a different way,
by viewing the talents and abilities of each member of society as the
common assets of all (pp. 103-04). This too is an argument that appears in Rawls. 35 Martin, however, creates a new decisionmaking
principle out of it. Rather than maximize the benefit to the least advantaged member of society, says Martin, locate all the Pareto-optimal
(he calls them "pareto efficient") distributions of goods for a particular
society, and then choose the most egalitarian such distribution (pp. 91101). He demonstrates that, given one important additional assumption, this will lead to the same results as the maximin version of the
difference principle. 36
UTILITY

D

0

s

1

E

INDEX OF
PRIMARY GOODS

IfSis a point not quite sufficient for survival, and an individual is offered the certainty of DP or a
50-50 chance of either a gain to For a loss to C:: he will of course choose DP. since even a small
loss in primary goods will cost more in lost utility than will be gained by a large increase. But if
one is at point B and is offered a reasonable gamble of A or C:: or if one is at point E and offered
the same gamble to reach D or F, there seems every reason to accept the gamble if the odds are
even slightly in your favor. Wolff concludes that for maximin to be a rational strategy, the
decision matrix of possible outcomes must be configured around point DP.
35. J. RAWLS, supra note l, at 101-05.
36. The Pareto-efficiency egalitarian principle is always equivalent to maximin in a two-person or two-class universe. P. 93. Once more than two groups are involved, however, equivalency
requires the assumption of "chain connection" within the society, the condition that "whenever
the expectation of the least-advantaged group is increasing (as a result of increasing the expectation of the most-favored group), the expectations of all the other intermediate groups are also
increasing." P. 94.
Rawls believes it "plausible" that chain connection often exists with respect to benefits that
are widely diffused in society, but he also notes that "[t]he difference principle is not contingent
on these relations being satisfied." J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 82. For Martin, however, the
difference principle is contingent on the existence of chain connection, yet he does not believe
that chain connection always holds. Rather, he states that cases in which it does not hold are the
"unusual ones," where the application of the difference principle is "problematic." P. 96.
Martin seems, urilike Rawls, to have no principle of justice to apply in such cases. But he
then says: "And where chain connection fails to hold, transfer payments to the adversely af·
fected intermediate group(s) could be employed - precisely as they are now in the case of the
least-well-off group." P. 97.
This last statement seems quite inconsistent with Martin's previous elaboration of his princi·
pie. It seems to imply that there is another state of distribution (the one after the transfer pay·
ment is made) that is also Pareto-efficient, but more equal than the previously existing situation.
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But is Martin's Pareto-efficient egalitarian principle any easier to
justify? Martin does not argue that his principle, rather than maximin, would be chosen in the original position. If he did, he would
likely run into all the criticisms leveled against the maximin argument. 37 But Martin recognizes that he does not have to make such an
argument. Given the nondeductive nature of Rawls' argument, he
does not have to claim that his principle is the only rational choice in
the original position. He need only argue that it is the best choice, the
principle that other members could be persuaded to adopt. Martin
thinks that the argument that can persuade them to adopt it is the
argument that talents and abilities are the common assets of all members of society (p. 106).
If one views people's talents and abilities in that way, it is certainly
plausible to argue that they should be used in the most effective way
possible (Pareto-efficiently), and the fruits of those talents then divided
as equally as possible (the egalitarian principle). Martin thus argues
that the common-asset argument can be used to justify his new version
of the difference principle (p. 106).
But how good is the common-asset argument? It too has come in
for a considerable amount of criticism. It hinges on the notion that
individuals with natural talents and abilities do not deserve them, but
are simply the recipients of good fortune. As Rawls argues:
No one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favorable
starting place in society. But it does not follow that one should eliminate
these distinctions. There is another way to deal with them. The basic
structure can be arranged so that these contingencies work for the good
of the least fortunate. Thus we are led to the difference principle if we
wish to set up a social system so that no one gains or loses from his
arbitrary place in the distribution of natural assets or his initial position
in society without giving or receiving compensating advantages in
retum. 38
Nozick has analyzed this argument in some detail, questioning
both its premises and its conclusion. 39 His main attack is on Rawls'
But if that is the case, such a distribution should have been the one chosen originally under
Martin's principle, since it is the most egalitarian of Pareto-efficient distributions. If such transfer payments are always possible, then Martin seems to be claiming that chain connection is
always possible, contradicting his earlier statement. But ifMartin means to imply that the transfer payments will result in a distribution that was not Pareto-efficient, he seems to be violating his
own principle, which limits the distributional choices to Pareto-efficient states.
37. Note that Martin's principle, for example, would still require that Harsanyi's scarce drug
be given to the terminally ill patient rather than the one whose life it will save, since that will
create a more egalitarian distribution of goods.
38. J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 102.
39. R. NOZICK, supra note 4, at 213-31. He notes that Rawls simply assumes that if individual talents are undeserved, in a moral sense, then they should be shared as common assets.
Nozick questions this presumption in favor of equality, noting that Rawls does not even attempt
to justify the claim that undeserved assets should be shared equally. Id. at 223-24. But this is the
kind of situation where reflective equilibrium can be used by Rawls to free himselffrom having to
justify his justifying principles. It is certainly a plausible statement about our considered moral
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assertion that no one deserves his natural talents and abilities. Nozick
distinguishes between the talents themselves and the benefits that flow
from the use of those talents, and argues that even if the former are
undeserved, one may still be entitled to the latter. As he states:
If people have x; and their having X (whether or not they deserve to
have it) does not violate anyone else's (Lockean) right or entitlement to

x; and Y flows from (arises out of, and so on) X by a process that does
not itself violate anyone's (Lockean) rights or entitlements, then the person is entitled to Y.40

Nozick argues, for example, that a painter is entitled to keep his
painting, that Rawls is entitled to praise for A Theory ofJustice, even if
they cannot be shown to deserve their talents. As he states, "[i]t
needn't be that the foundations underlying desert are themselves deserved, all the way down."41
Martin, like Nozick, accepts a distinction between desert and entitlement, but it is different from Nozick's. Martin wants to reserve the
term "entitlement" for holdings that a person legitimately has without
having taken any action to obtain them. His paradigm example is the
Prince of Wales, who is entitled to be King of England by his birthright, although he has done nothing to deserve it. Notice the distinction between Martin's examples of entitlements and Nozick's. Prince
Charles is undoubtedly entitled to be King of England, but that entitlement rests on a whole series of facts about English law and society
which are highly contingent and morally arbitrary. We would tend to
say that his entitlement is a legal but not a moral claim. If England
were to adopt a republican form of government, or crown the Stuart
pretender on the ground that he had the better legal claim, we might
be surprised, but we would not feel that Charles had been deprived of
something he morally ought to have. 42
In contrast, when Nozick asserts that a painter is entitled to his
painting, he is referring to something more fundamental and of more
direct moral significance than the property rules of a particular legal
regime. If a law were passed confiscating certain paintings so that
they could be put on permanent public display, Nozick would not simply view this as a change in legal entitlements (the way Martin would
view a change in the succession laws of England). Rather, he would
claim that the state was taking something to which it was not entitled;
it would be subject to moral attack on that basis.43
judgments that, when there are valued assets that no one can claim to deserve (e.g., national
parks, World Series tickets) we tend to believe that the fairest way to distribute such assets is on a
principle of equality either of opportunity or result.
40. Id. at 225.
41. Id. (emphasis omitted).
42. This ignores, of course, such morally based concepts as reliance or estoppel.
43. In making this distinction between moral and legal claims, I do not mean to imply that
the determination of legal claims can never hinge on moral arguments. Indeed it can, as I will
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Martin recognizes that his concept of entitlement presupposes an
existing set of social and legal institutions in a way that Nozick's does
not. Martin chooses, however, to emphasize the similarities between
his argument and Nozick's, rather than the differences. Martin argues
that a Rawlsian can (and that Rawls himself does) accept Nozick's
premise that "people are entitled to their natural assets" and can
therefore accept his conclusion that people are entitled to the holdings
they develop through their natural talents and abilities (p. 167).
Thus, Martin demonstrates that Rawls, like Nozick, can justify an
economic system in which those with greater than average talents receive greater than average gains. To some extent this is a refutation of
Nozick, in that it shows that the intuitive notions of "entitlement" he
appeals to can be accommodated and accounted for in a Rawlsian system. But the arguments the two philosophers would make to justify
greater returns for those with greater abilities are quite different and as every lawyer knows, the argument made in support of a result
can be as important as the result itself.
Nozick's concept of entitlement is both fundamental and directly
normative. People are entitled to their natural talents and abilities because they have such natural talents and abilities, and have them without infringing anyone else's liberty. They therefore should (in a strong
normative sense) have the fruits of those talents. Martin's concept of
entitlement is derivative of a particular social and legal system and
only marginally normative. People are entitled to the fruits of their
natural talents and abilities if those are the returns appropriately established under the legal and economic regime created in accordance
with principles of justice. If the organizing principles of the society
are just, such returns may be said to be just. As Martin states:
Desert is a moral notion, but it is not a first-order one in this theory. It
is subordinated . . . to the principles of justice and to the institutions of
the basic structure of a particular well-ordered society. Thus, we should
not say that individuals have the returns that they are entitled to because
they deserve them but, rather, that whatever the returns are, under the
conditions specified, they could be said to be deserved in the relevant
sense. [p. 167]

Martin uses the multistage nature of Rawls' system to defuse
Nozick's argument. Because he locates concepts of desert or entitlement not as fundamental principles, but as derivative concepts within
a preexisting legal and economic system, those concepts lose their abilargue later in this piece. But one can still distinguish conceptually between claims of entitlement
that are based on specific legal arrangements (such as Martin's), and those that invoke general
ethical principles (like Nozick's) which are claimed to apply irrespective of the legal system. I
will argue later, however, that claims to rights can be conceptually "legal" in that they legitimately invoke authoritative legal materials and yet not be enforced by the institutions of the
state.

888

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 85:871

ity to function as critiques of the fundamental structure of society. 44
Martin's discussion of Rawls' theory of rights is less successful.
Although Rawls speaks of rights in a number of different contexts in A
Theory of Justice, he never sets forth a coherent account of rights. Indeed in Rawls, as in many other theorists, there is a tendency to move
back and forth between accounts of rights as legally enforceable claims
and as normative arguments in support of certain claims. 45 Martin
attempts to sharpen and render coherent the Rawlsian account of
rights. In so doing, unfortunately, Martin uses an overly determinate
model of legal decisionmaking, and he insufficiently recognizes the
role that claims about rights can play in formulating legal arguments
that seek to change the prevailing response of legal institutions.
Martin recognizes the ambiguity of using rights to describe both
moral aspirations and legally enforceable claims. He tries to get
around the problem by defining a "proper right" as containing both a
moral and legal component. As he states:
There is, we see on reflection, an irreducible duality to human or natural
rights. On the one side, they are morally validated claims to some benefit or other. On the other side, such rights require recognition in law and
promotion by government of the claimed way of acting or of being
treated. Neither side is dispensable in a human or natural right. [p. 39]

What about rights that are recognized but not enforced by the
legal system of a certain country? To Martin, these are merely "nominal rights." As he says, they give "no normative direction to the conduct of other persons in fact; such persons act as if the right did not
exist even on paper" (p. 34). A right which is neither recognized nor
enforced is to Martin "merely a morally valid claim" (p. 38). For
Martin, "[t]he crucial issue . . . is whether appropriate practices of
recognition and promotion are in place for that kind of right. For
without such social recognition and maintenance, whatever was said
to be justified, on moral grounds, would not be a proper right" (p. 39).
To Martin, rights are a sort oflicense or guarantee, usually granted
by the government, that individuals will be permitted to engage in certain activities, or be safeguarded against injury by the activities of
others. He rejects as incoherent Rawls' statement that there is a right
to equal basic liberties in the original position. Since arguments in the
original position are logically prior to any social or institutional arrangements, there can be no "proper rights" at that stage (p. 41).
44. Martin does not deal with the deeper question of whether Rawls - by subordinating
concepts of desert, entitlement, and all other attributes of individuals, so that the individual's
claim to justice in the original position is separate from and prior to any such considerations - is
left with such a weak concept of the individual that it cannot function as the basis of a claim for
individual rights and autonomy. See M. SANDEL, supra note 7, especially at 77-95. If Rawls has
a way out of this criticism, it lies, I believe, not in analyzing the concept of the individual in the
original position, but in the dialogic relationship between Rawls and his readers that is envisioned in Rawls' discussion of reflective equilibrium.
45. See Westen, The Rueful Rhetoric of "Rights," 33 UCLA L. REV. 977 (1986).

April-May 1987]

Arguing About Rights

889

Martin's notion of rights as legally protected zones of action,
which can be parceled out to individuals on an equal basis, is indeed a
concept of rights that can be found in Rawls. 46 But in attempting to
elaborate and defend that concept, Martin relies on a determinate and
deductive account of legal decisionmaking which, while present in
Rawls, 47 is not the only concept of normative decisionmaking available in his theory and is not a particularly plausible account of law at least as law is currently understood and spoken about in the United
States. First, the account fails to consider the substantial degree to
which legal rules are expressed in and rely upon moral concepts and
moral language. A moral claim may not only be grounds for adopting
a legal rule, but also may, under certain legal regimes, itself constitute
a legal claim. For example, if I say that garnishing wages without
providing a hearing is unfair and should be prohibited by statute, I am
making a moral claim for the creation of a legal right. But if I say that
garnishing wages without providing a hearing violates the due process
clause because it is unfair, 48 I am making an assertion about existing
law which relies on a moral claim.
There are of course many rules in the American legal system
which rely on moral concepts, particularly in the area of most interest
to Martin - constitutional rights. This does not mean that it is impossible for us or Martin to distinguish conceptually between legal and
moral claims, but it does cast doubt on the usefulness of that distinction in defining what Martin calls "proper rights." If we believe that
in our legal system a powerful moral argument can and should affect
the way legal rules are understood and applied by governmental institutions, then why does Martin consider it improper to speak of having
a "right" at the time that one is aware of a _powerful moral argument
that one believes can and should affect the way courts will apply the
legal rules? Martin would apparently respond that such a right is not
yet a "proper right" because we do not know for sure whether it will
be enforced by courts or other governmental bodies. Such a view,
however, fails to recognize the indeterminacy and malleability of legal
argument, the way argument can change the prevailing understandings of rules, and the different levels of generality at which authoritative legal rules can operate.
Consider the situation of black schoolchildren in Alabama in 1953.
Did they have a "right" to attend integrated schools? The fourteenth
amendment - with its guarantees that no state could infringe the
privileges and immunities of its citizens, or deny them equal protection
of the laws on the basis of race - was a recognized and frequently
46. It is most clearly apparent in Rawls' discussion of how basic liberties can be secured at
the constitutional stage. J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 195-211.
47. Id. at 348-49.
48. See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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enforced part of the authoritative legal structure of the United States.
Yet those general constitutional guarantees had not been translated, at
the legislative or adjudicative levels, into a right to attend integrated
schools. This was in part due to the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the fourteenth amendment in Plessy v. Ferguson, 49 that "separate but
equal" facilities for blacks were constitutionally permissible, and in
part due to a factual claim that separate schools for blacks were or
could be equal. By 1953 powerful arguments existed (and by powerful
I mean that many people, with and without legal training, found them
to be persuasive) that both the legal and factual premises on which the
constitutionality of segregated schools was based were incorrect. One
who took such a position could plausibly state that blacks had a
"right" to attend integrated schools in 1953, even though such a right
had not been recognized by the United States Supreme Court. Such
an assertion of rights would be a recognizably legal claim, not simply a
moral one, since it would be based on authoritative legal materials.so
Consider also whether a constitutional right to privacy existed in
1927, the year before Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead v.
United States, 51 invoked the existence of such a right. No such right is
expressly stated in the Constitution, nor had it ever been declared by
the Supreme Court, yet Brandeis, by analyzing prior Court cases that
considered the propriety of particular governmental actions, argued
that these cases, which surely represented "authoritative legal materials," demonstrated the existence of a "right" to privacy at the constitutional level. It is hard to characterize Brandeis' argument as simply
a moral claim that a right should exist. Rather, he argued that a legal
right did exist, as demonstrated by the prior actions of authoritative
governmental bodies. Even though Brandeis was writing in dissent,
his opinion changed the way those prior cases were perceived by
judges and lawyers, and it is therefore plausible to say that his opinion
gave rise to the constitutional right to privacy.
One can imagine Martin protesting at this point that the preceding
arguments represent just the kind of sloppy thinking his more rigorous
definition of "right" was intended to prevent. He might argue that my
two previous examples muddy up the important distinction between
rights that are recognized by authoritative materials at some level in
the legal regime but are not enforced and those rights that are both
recognized and enforced. Only the latter, he would claim, should be
considered "proper rights." While the fourteenth amendment or the
cases Brandeis cited in Olmstead could be considered authoritative
legal materials that provided some recognition to the rights involved,
49. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
50. This, of course, was precisely the argument made to the Supreme Court in Brown
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
51. 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928).
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the fact remains that those rights were not being enforced by the
courts at the times involved and thus should be distinguished from
activities that were actually being protected by the legal system at
those times.
The problem with this argument is that if the term "right" is restricted solely to those legal claims for which litigants can actually
obtain judicial relief, it ceases to bear much resemblance to the way
the term is actually used either in legal or ordinary discourse. Consider the question whether black schoolchildren in Alabama had the
right to attend legally integrated schools in 1955. By that time Brown
v. Board of Education had been decided, and, on most views, the legal
"right" to integrated schooling had been definitively established. But
in 1955 black schoolchildren in Alabama had virtually no hope of obtaining judicial enforcement of their "right." The Supreme Court had
only required integration "with all deliberate speed" (and only with
respect to the Topeka school system). While declaring the right, they
had indefinitely delayed the remedy. Moreover, no matter what the
Supreme Court said, no trial court in Alabama in 1955 was going to
order integration. It was going to take a massive civil rights movement and years of further litigation before any such enforcement orders would be forthcoming. On Martin's definition then, blacks in
Alabama had no more "proper right" to attend integrated schooling in
1955 than in 1953, yet most of us would agree that their legal position
had changed dramatically in the intervening year.
Conversely, consider whether a criminal defendant today, charged
with a capital crime, has a right not to be executed by the state. The
correct legal answer is surely that no such right exists. The Supreme
Court has made it emphatically clear during the last fifteen years that
the death penalty itself does not violate constitutional restraints on
cruel and unusual punishment. Yet if we look at the legal world from
Martin's perspective and ask what activities governmental bodies will
act to prevent, we find that there are many states with capital punishment statutes on their books that have not executed anyone in many
years. 52 In some of these states, courts, aware of the legal and factual
uncertainties involved in such cases, are generally willing to grant motions for stays of execution. In others prosecutors do not often seek
the sanction. In such states, authoritative governmental bodies are
certainly enforcing morally based rules that prevent the imposition of
capital punishment, yet we would not be inclined to say that a "right"
against capital punishment is being enforced.
In short, one cannot identify "rights" with the orders actually is52. For example, according to statistics compiled by the Justice Department, as of 1984 there
had been no executions during the last twenty years in any of the states of the Northeast,
although most of those states retained capital punishment statutes. BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1984, at 3 (Table 2), 7 (Table 10) (1985)
(National Prisoner Statistics).
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sued by governmental bodies, since these can issue for hundreds of
reasons, often with little or no relation to the substantive "rights" of
the parties involved. Rather, "rights" tend to refer to a more general
and hypothetical view of legal process; not what courts will actually
order, but what they should order (assuming the case is timely
brought, filed in the right court, properly argued, etc.). But once we
move to this more general and normative level, the problems of the
indeterminacy of legal rules and the malleability of legal argument return. I suspect that the very effort to define a "proper right" in such a
way as to distinguish it from a strong legal argument is a misguided
effort based on an overly positivistic view of law. What is clear is that
Martin's definition does not enable us to make such distinctions, but,
as we have seen, yields some rather bizarre conclusions about the
existence or nonexistence of rights.
The difficulties with Martin's approach to rights are even more apparent when he deals with conflicts between rights. Here he extends
his view of rights as zones of legally protected activities, giving them
other physical characteristics such as scope and weight. He suggests
that the way to minimize conflicts between rights is for the scope of
each right to be carefully delineated, either at the constitutional or
legislative stage, so that it is possible to determine, with respect to any
activity, whether it falls within the protected zone.
He suggests, for example, that in delineating the scope of the right
to free speech, one first must define speech as "all that is said, except
incitement" and "all that is printed, except incitement" (p. 132). One
can then narrow the zone of protected speech by excluding those activities which, although they are "speech" under the definition given, are
not protected. The two activities Martin suggests are obscenity and
libel (p. 132).
It is conceivable that by proceeding in this way the "right to free
speech" could be clarified so that members of society would be able to
predict, with greater certainty, whether a given action was or was not
included. But Martin never considers whether such clarity is always
desirable in legal rules, and particularly in formulations of rights.
Under his proposed definition of speech, neither draft-card burnings
nor campaign spending would be included. One might argue that a
better formulation of the right to free speech would be one that was
sufficiently loose or unclear to permit the argument that one or both of
these activities were sufficiently like "all that is spoken or printed" to
warrant protection. Similarly, although Martin mentions the rule
against prior restraints (p. 136), it is hard to see how it can be justified
on his account of free speech. If obscene or libelous speech is not
within the protected zone, Martin seems to have no basis for justifying
a rule that prohibits courts from enjoining the publication of libelous
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or obscene speech. 53 Rather, any such justification would seem to
have to recognize certain zones of unclarity in which activities were
neither fully protected nor fully unprotected. 54
Indeed, the notion that "clear" legal rules are always to be preferred over unclear legal standards is itself highly problematic. Every
lawyer is familiar with instances in which a "bright-line rule" can be
abused to achieve results quite contrary to those intended. The argument that legal standards must sometimes be sufficiently loose to take
into account factors that cannot be specifically delineated, but that are
required to do justice in the individual case, is a concept at least as old
as the maxims of equity.5 5
In order to resolve conflicts between rights, Martin must introduce
the concept of the "weight" as well as the scope of a right. Weight is
expressed as a test setting forth the countervailing conditions that
would have to exist in order to abrogate the right. For example, Martin derives from Rawls the test that freedom of speech may only be
abrogated on national security grounds when it presents "imminent
and unavoidable danger of a 'constitutional crisis of the requisite
kind' " (a more stringent reworking of the "clear and present danger
test") (p. 135).
Notice that Martin has provided an account of adjudication which
involves a purely deductive form of argument. The major premise, the
"test" for determining whether the right may be abrogated, is independently and authoritatively established in the legal materials. Given the
existence of such a test, all that remains is the empirical determination
that an activity does or does not satisfy the test. Once such a determination is made, the conclusion - to abrogate the right or not - is
logically compelled.
Again, one can question whether this purely deductive model of
adjudication is either desirable or even possible. Certainly it does not
describe the process of adjudication familiar to American lawyers. In
large numbers of cases in our system, the "test" itself is a matter of
dispute. It is not available from preexisting authoritative legal materials, and must be induced from case law. Such case law often presents
numerous plausible formulations of the relevant test, or presents numerous conflicting tests that might be used to decide the case. Often,
53. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
54. For example, the standard justification of the rule against prior restraints is that such
restraints create a "chilling effect" which inhibits publication not just of the {presumably unprotected) libelous or obscene speech, but of constitutionally protected speech as well. Note that
such an argument presumes a significant amount of indeterminacy in the determination of rights,
because it assumes that publishers will often be unable to tell whether or not their activities are
legally protected.
55. See, e.g., Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685 (1976); Bratton, Manners, Metaprinciples, Metapolitics and Kennedy's Form and Substance,
6 CARDOZO L. REV. 871 (1986); Shupack, Rules and Standards in Kennedy's Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 947 (1986).
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where a certain formulation of the test is recognized as authoritative,
the formulation is sufficiently vague that the activities in question may
be appropriately characterized as either satisfying or not satisfying the
test.
It is unfortunate that Martin, who recognizes the nondeductive nature of Rawls' argument and the problems of using purely deductive
arguments generally to establish moral claims, should revert to a
purely deductive model when giving an account of legal argument.
There is available within Rawls' work a richer model of argumentation
which relies on both inductive and deductive modes of argument, is
philosophically defensible, and is much closer to the way lawyers and
others actually argue about rights in a legal context. It is to be found
in Rawls' own methodology. 5 6
Despite its failings as a theory of rights, Rawls and Rights makes a
significant contribution to the Rawlsian literature. Not only does it
clarify important aspects of Rawlsian methodology, including the
nondeductive nature of Rawls' argument, but it also exemplifies the
continuing vitality of that method by extending Rawlsian concepts
and Rawlsian arguments in ways that respond to important criticisms
of Rawls.

56. Indeed, Martin's own justification for the nondeductive nature of Rawls' argument in the
original position can be used to critique his theory of rights. P. 16. If the appropriate response of
the adjudicative body is deductively determined by the authoritative legal system, only onejudi·
cial response is possible and all the others are totally ineligible. But if legal argument, like the
argument in the original position, is designed to provide (as Martin states) a "ranking" of possible outcomes, then there must be more than one outcome that is at least plausible under the
prevailing legal regime.

